THE ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE IN JAPAN.*

PART I.

In various quarters the material has recently been furnished
from which we may intelligently form an opinion upon the
difficult subject of the title of this paper. What we need is,
first, some information as to the methods of justice and notions
of law current in the epoch before the Restoration of 1868;
and, second, an acquaintance with what has been accomplished
during the new regime of the past twenty-five years in the
way of reform and systematization. We shall then be in a position to understand the conditions under which justice is now
administered in that country. This subject is of more practical
importance in international affairs at the present time than the
modes of justice of most other nations, because of its bearing
on Japan's demand for the abolition of extra-territorial jurisdiction by Western powers within her boundaries. The object
of this paper, therefore, will be in particular to present as far
as possible the leading considerations which should affect the
propriety or impropriety of yielding to that demand, and to set
forth the general facts relating to Japan's legal system, past as
well as present, which will put it in the power of Western
nations to form a well-grounded opinion on the question of
restoring Japan's judicial autonomy.
The paper makes, therefore, no pretence at originality. It
only presents in connected form what is to be found scattered
in various magazines, transactions and newspapers almost
inaccessible to the public. These sources, with two exceptions,
own the writer of this paper as their author; and he has welcomed this opportunity to bring together these fragments at
this time so as to present, in a connected order and to a wider
audience, the material for truly estimating the present conditions of law and justice in that much-misunderstood country,
the terra ignota for jurists, Japan.
*Paper presented to the World's Congress on Government, Section of
Jurisprudence and Law Reform, at Chicago, x893.
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THE LAW OF THE OLD R.GIME.

In Puchta's " Outline of the Science of Right" occur the
following passages: "The relationships of Rights are the
relations of one man to another, and may be called legal relations. But the various human relationships do not enter, in
their full extent, into the sphere of Right, because the legal
notion of a person rests upon an abstraction and does not
embrace the whole being of man. There must, therefore,
occur much modification and substraction before we reach the
special relations which alone are involved in the idea of a
Right. Thus, suppose a man has arisen from a protracted
illness, and in order to pay the bill of his physician, to provide
for the urgent wants of his family, due to recent incapacity,
and to procure the means of beginning business again, he goes
to a well-disposed neighbor, whom he has helped in former
times, and obtains a loan at the usual rate. How much of all
this must we not leave out in order to ascertain the purely
jural relation between the parties! Compare with this the
case of the rich man who raises capital merely to add to his
possessions by a new speculation, and consider the effort of
abstraction which is required in order to assimilate the resulting legal relations. And yet the legal relations in these two
cases are identical."
For the Anglo-Saxon lawyer, accustomed as no other is to
do homage to strict legal principle, as in and for itself the
summum bonum of law, and to regard legal justice as manifesting itself only in a science of unbending rules, this quotation will indicate better than anything else, the vast gulf that
is fixed between his own system and that which was indigenous to Japan. By making generalizations into hard-and-fast
rules, by strictly eliminating in individual cases a variety of
important moral considerations (much as certain English
economists worked out their science with respect only to the

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN JAPAN.

wcalth-acquiring motive), the Anglo-Saxons have succeeded in
creating a special type of justice. This tendency of theirs is so
strong that English Equity, the one great effort to counteract
it, has become in the end identical in these respects with the
whole system. But there are peoples to whom this type of
justice is utterly alien. Even on the Continent this imiersonalization (if we may so call it) of justice has never reached
such an extreme. For example, the French Civil Code has a
" dlai de grdce" which the court may accord to a debtor
whose misfortunes render inequitable the immediate enforcement of a claim in its entirety (though even this has been
abandoned in the new Italian Code).
But it is in Japan that we may find the extreme antithesis to
the Anglo-Saxon conception of justice. Whether there is or
not any practical lesson for us in studying this opposite type,
is a question which we need not here take up. However
this may be, the chief characteristic of Japanese justice, as
distinguished from our own, may be said to be this tendency
to consider all the circumstances of individual cases, to confide
the relaxation of principles to judicial discretion, to balance
the benefits and disadvantages of a given course, not for all
time in a fixed rule, but anew in each instance, in short, to
make justice personal, not impersonal. It would not be fair
to infer from this that the courts of old Japan could have been
no better than the tents of an Arab Sheikh, where justice came
roughly and speedily, and the good sense of the tribunal was
the only measure of equity. On the contrary, there was in
Japan a legal system, a body of clear and consistent rules, a
collection of statutes and of binding precedents. But whether
it be or not a mere mark of primitive legal development, there
was always the disposition to take, as Puchta puts it, "the
whole being of man " into consideration, to arrange a given
dispute in the most expedient way, to sacrifice legal principle
to present expediency. This is the first notable characteristic.
The second is that Japanese justice was essentially feudal in
its spirit. At every step this quality shows itself Chiefly
affected by it, of course, was the criminal law. The common
people necessarily came in for a meagre amount of respect in
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the feudal polity, except as wealth-producing instruments, on,
whose effectiveness the subsistence of the military class depended. They were restricted and punished with a severitycharacteristic of feudalism everywhere. The features of their
status, and the kinds of pnnishments, were not substantiallydifferent from those of European nations at similar stages ofsocial development. On the civil side the result of feudalism;
was that the dispensing of justice between disputants appeared
as a boon from the lord to his suppliant subjects. The first
duty of the faithful commoner was not to disturb his lord's.
peace and waste his own time by becoming involved in a dispute. A litigious community was the worse of evils. Ant
obstinate plaintiff, even with a just cause, might fare in the end.
not much better than the defendant.
Another consequence of the spirit of feudalism was the discouragement of appeals. Appeals there were, to be sure;
but the generally indispensable ground was that of corruption,
prejudice or delay on the part of the inferior judge; and it
must be confessed that such appeals were dangerous for the
poor peasant, for it went hard with him if he did not make out
a clear case against the obnoxious judge, and the many diffioulties of accomplishing this, rendered such appeals infrequent.
These being two of the noticeable features of Japanese justice, it must be remembered that none the less was there a real
legal system in existence, similar in form and history to that
wrought out by the Anglo-Saxon. By this is meant a body
of legal notions, establishing relationships of right under given
circumstances, and applied in systematic fashion by political
authorities to disputes brought before the tribunals. These
notions were to be found partly in statutes, partly in local
customs, and partly in the precedents and practice of thecourts. In the latter realm the development of these ideas byreasoning from analogy played as clear, if not as important a
part as in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. It was, in Japan, the
judges themselves who accomplished this development, not,
as in some nations, an order of jurisconsults or of religious
advisers. The precedents were not all in the shape of decisions directly rendered in controversies. There were, first, the.
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general precedents established by the Supreme Tribunal
(Hyoj-slho), in council assembled. The decision, however,
usually took the shape of a vote upon a proposition submitted
by a single judge, who was in doubt and had no precedent to
guide him, or wished to change an existing rule; for the chief
members were magistrates already exercising an important
original jurisdiction of their own. Secondly, judges of equal
rank, but separate jurisdiction, often consulted one another on
knotty cases, and agreed thereafter to follow- a certain rule
mutually decided on. Thirdly, a daimyo from a distant fief
(having independent judicial powers) sometimes consulted one
of the chief judges of the Central Government, the Shogunate.
Fourthly, the Supreme Tribunal often passed resolutions asking the approval of the Council of State (the controlling
ministry who exercised the virtual power in the Shogun's
name) for certain rules, deemed to be of special importance,
this approval usually following as a matter of course. Finally,
there were sundry minor ways in which precedents were
added, and legal ideas expanded. The Council of State sometimes consulted the Supreme Tribunal on a point of law; and,
what is still more interesting, a merchant was frequently asked
to advise the tribunal as to the bearing of a commercial custom.
I have said that appeals were discouraged. But these consultations of one judge with another, or of the Supreme
Tribunal with one of its members, practically took the place
which appeals occupy with us; for where any really doubtful
questions arose, a judge was ready enough to seek advice or
put the responsibility of decision upon his superiors.
On the whole, then, while it is sometimes difficult to define
the exact line at which the system of justice in a people
ceases to deserve the name of jurisprudence, and is to be
esteemed as merely customary or arbitrary, there can be no
doubt that Japan under the old r6gime belonged to the higher
category. Whether its national system, freed from the bond
of feudalism, would have shown a capacity for development
equal to some in the West, is an attractive question. But the
logic of events has established Western laws here too firmly
to allow us to expect ever to see an historical solution of it;
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and our present lack of knowledge makes it impossible as
yet to hazard an opinion upon what might have been.
From this attempt to sketch-some chief features of indigenous Japanese justice, we may pass to a few details, concerning the judges, courts, and legal methods in general.
The administration of justice was not confided to a separate governmental department (a characteristic of which
European States still show strong traces), and an enumeration
of the grades of administrative officials would include most
of the judicial ones also. It must be noted, too, that we
have to deal in reality with a number of petty states, not
merely a single judicial system. Feudalism kept the country
divided under a number of powerful nobles, and although
these were not politically independent of the Shogun, the
Viceroy of the Emperor at Yedo, the Shogun was theoretically only primus inter pares as regarded every matter on
which he did not choose to legislate in the name of the
Emperor, and thus the judicial functions of the powerful
daimyo not friendly to the Shogun (as well, indeed, as of some
others) were exercised, for the most part, quite independently.
In many matters of inheritance and marriage in noble families,
political reasons had induced the Shogun to legislate, and, as
we shall see, the Supreme Tribunal of the Shogunate took
cognizance of disputes between different federal lords and
between vassals owing diverse allegiance. But in ordinary
civil and criminal matters there was a practical independence
varying in degree according to the influence of the fief. The
immediate possessions of the Tokugawa family (in whose line
the Shogunate power descended after 1603) embraced a little
less than one-third of the national territory; but, as Herr
Rudorff has suggested, the indirect influence of their legislation and judiciary must have been great, and one may say,
speaking roughly, that Tokugawa jurisprudence was valid as
a type for at least one-half the country. The first Tokugawa
Shogun, Iyeyasu (1603-1616), and his grandson Iyemitsu
(1632-1652) occupy, with reference to the political and legal
unification of the country, a position similar to that of William
I. and Henry II. in England. But they were never able to
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achieve the results which the English monarchs produced,
and this lack of thorough union was the most important
influence in keeping the feudal spirit everywhere alive. The
materials for the study of legal development in the various
fiefs still lie hidden in the store-houses of the noble families;
and some slight acquaintance with the Tokugawa system is
all that is at present attainable. We may be sure, however,
that in this portion of the empire Japanese jurisprudence
reached its highest development.
After i65o the Tokugawa Shoguns were, for the most part,
fainhzants, and the real power lay with the Council of State
(Goroju), the Shogun's advisers. Decrees, ordinances, and
regulations emanated from this source, and reference was
often made to the Council on judicial matters. But practically the highest judicial tribunal was the Chamber of Decisions (Hyojo-sho),finallyconstituted about 1634. The working
members of this Supreme Tribunal were the Town Magistrate
of Yedo, the Temple Magistrate, and the Magistrate of
Treasury Lawsuits. Each of these in his capacity as a magistrate of original jurisdiction, dealt with special classes of litigation-the Town Magistrate with suits involving merchants
of Yedo (practically all Yedo commoners); the Temple Magistrate, with all questions involving the priesthood, chiefly disputes over temple-lands; and the other magistrate with all
important controversies over taxes, etc., as well as with
difficult cases reported for decision from the provincial officials, whose duties were primarily fiscal. But at stated times
the sessions of this court were attended by one of the Council
of State, and on other occasions by one of the Censors, rather
by way of inspection than as a sharer in the proceedings.
The Shogun himself twice a year appeared at the session.
The regular sessions occurred thrice a month-on the second,
twelfth, and twenty-second days, with continuances, when riecessary. Besides the appellate jurisdiction, already mentioned,
in case of corrupt decisions or delayed justice, the Supreme
Tribune had original jurisdiction in disputes between subjects
of different fiefs, between a subject of an ordinary fief and a
subject of the Tokugawa dominions, between Tokugawa sub-
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jects belonging to different magisterial jurisdictions, between
different daimyo, and in cases of treason or of crimes by high
officials. But the lines were not strictly drawn, and this
enumeration is only substantially correct. So far as concerns
the development of the law, the most important organs were
this Supreme Chamber, the three magistrates (Sambugyo,
their usual designation), and the Town Magistrates of a few
other chief cities, such as Osaka, Kyoto, Nagasaki, Nara, and
Sakai. When the treasures of recorded material, now stored
away in these places, are brought to view, and the case-books
of the various Tokugawa magistracies, as well as of the
officials in the independent fiefs are properly studied, we shall
know something complete and accurate in regard to the
growth and conditions of law; but as yet only the outline is
distinct.
Out in the country districts all lawsuits came before the
reeve, or general administrative officer (daikwan, koribugyo,
etc.; there were various titles). One of these was set over
each district, the area being fixed by custom and convenience;
it might contain from fifty to one hundred villages. But at
this point we begin to lose sight of anything like systematic
jurisprudence. Justice becomes an administrative rather than
a judicial matter. The part which precedent and rule play in
settling controversies becomes less and less; and the part of
compromise and conciliation increases. When finally the
initial stage of a dispute is reached, we find that the surroundings have quite changed. Justice is attained not so much by
the aid of the law as by mutual consent. Customs there are,
and definite ones; but they are always applied through arbitration and concession. This feature of the jural life of the
nation is not without its parallel among other Oriental peoples;
but I fancy that it is here peculiarly pronounced, and it is worth
dwelling upon. I have spoken of the marked disposition to
make justice personal, to let many external considerations
enter into the settlement cf a controversy, The exigencies of
mercantile life in towns reduced this disposition to a minimum;
but it attained its greatest influence in the country. But,
joined with this, perhaps even more powerful and deeper-rooted
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in the character of the people, was the tendency to conciliation,
to make everything smooth,-a tendency which is still, I
think, the best key to much of the Japanese character. Not
to attempt too much refinement of analysis, it may, perhaps,
be laid down that a chief quality of that character is not so
much a predominance of the emotional nature as the comparative weakness of the will. A consequent disinclination to act,
a desire to avoid obstacles, to make things as easy as possible,
explain many traits. The fierce determination to do, which
Anglo-Saxons know so well, is wanting. The leisurely way
of carrying out an undertaking, the shrinking from physical
violence,-these seem to point back to the quality I have
named.
The result, then, was a universal resort to arbitration and
compromise as a primary means of settling disputes. It was,
and to a great extent still is, an ingrained principle of the
Japanese social system that every dispute should, if by any
means possible, be smoothed out by resort to private or public
arbitration. The machinery of local government, under the
old regime, was employed for this purpose, if friendly mediation failed; but no efforts were to be spared to settle the
matter in this way, and in practice the vast majority of
disputes were so disposed of.
The principle of arbitration resulted thus. In case of a
disagreement between members of a kumi (company of five
neighbors, into which every town and village was divided), the
five heads of families met and endeavored to settle the matter.
All minor difficulties were usually ended in this way. A time
was appointed for the meeting; food and wine were set out;
and there was moderate eating and drinking, just as at a
dinner-party. If a settlement failed, or a man repeated his
offence frequently, he might be complained of to the next in
authority, the chief of companies; or else the neighbors might
take matters into their own hands and break off intercourse
with him, refusing to recognize him socially. This usually
brought him to terms. An appeal to the higher authorities
was, as a rule, the practice in larger towns and cities only,
where the family unity was somewhat weakened, and not in

AA6

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN JAPAN.

the villages, where there was a great dislike to seeking outside
coercion, and where few private disagreements went beyond
th6 family or the kumi.
A case which could not be settled in this way was regarded
as a disreputable one, or as indicating that the person seeking
the courts wished to get some advantage by tricks. In
arranging for a marriage partner for son or daughter, such
families as were in the habit of using this means of redress
were studiously avoided. It was a well-known fact that in
those districts where the people were fond of resorting to the
courts they were generally poor in consequence. The time
spent and the money lost reduced the community to poverty.
If even the company-chief could not settle the matter, it was
laid before the higher officers, the elder and the headman.
In fact, the chief village officers might almost be said to form
a board of arbitration for the settlement of appeals; for in
deciding the case, the headman received the suggestions of
the other officers. It was discreditable for a headman not to
be able to adjust a case satisfactorily, and he made all possible
efforts to do so. In specially difficult matters he might ask
the assistance of a neighboring headman. If the headman
was unable to settle a case, it was laid before the reeve, who,
however, almost invariably first sent it back, with the injunction to settle it by arbitration, putting it this time in the hands
of some neighboring headman, preferably one of high reputation for probity and capacity. When a case finally came
before the reeve for decision, it passed from the region of arbitration, and became a law-suit. From the reeve it might
pass to the higher officials at Yedo. But even when the case
finally came to the reeve's court, it was not treated in the
strictly legal style familiar to us. The spirit of Japanese
justice, as has been said, dictated a broader consideration of
the relations of the parties. What the judge aimed at was
general equity in each case. There was, of course, an important foundation of customary law and of statutes from which
all parties thought as little of departing as we do from the
Constitution; but these rules were applied to individual cases
with an elasticity depending upon the circumstances.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN JAPAN.

Each man was supposed in theory to advocate his own
cause. Nevertheless, many made a business of acting for
others. But the receiving of a fee was clandestine, and ostensibly the service was rendered as a favor.
There were no court fees, before either the headman of the
village, the reeve, or the magistrates. There was a large
staff of clerks and assistants at every town magistrate's and
reeve's office, and also in the Chamber of Judges; and to
these skilled permanent officials rather than to the magistrates
themselves was owed the systematic and consistent treatment
of litigation.
In the towns there was always a well-organized police
system. Ordinary watch duty was performed by the townsmen themselves, under regulations arranged at the wardmeetings; while the regular police were attached to the magistrate's office, and their duties were rather those of bailiffs and
detectives. In the country this portion of the work, by old
custom, was in the hands of one of the outcast classes, called
bantaro, or watchmen.
As to the extent of the legislation and the jurisprudence of
the Tokugawa Shogunate, it would be useless to enter into
details. In the rural districts the subject-matter of ordinary
legal relations hardly extended beyond land-holding, with the
various methods of tenancy, land sales, marriage, inheritance,
adoption, mortgages, and a few easements. The development
of definite customs was limited to these general subjects. In
the commercial communities legal relations were naturally more
varied and more complicated. The loaning of money gave
rise to a variety of distinctions and refinements, and furnished
a great portion of the litigation. Sale, in all its forms, and
with its attendant machinery of brokerage and credit, played
an equally important part. Agency, Set-off, Carriers, Bills of
Exchange, Checks, Commissions, Auctions, Damages, Penalties, Pledges,-these are some of the special topics in the
recorded cases. Of course analogies to our own system and
to others are plentiful. The form, however, even where the
legal result is the same, is often different, the result having
been reached by a different road. Thus, there existed the
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ordinary transaction of deposit for safe-keeping ; but as money
was often so deposited, and the privilege of loaning it was
frequently given at the same time, the rule grew up that the
depositary was not liable for loss by act of God (their phrase,
" calamity of Heaven," ran in curious correspondence with
our.own), where a res was bailed merely for safe-keeping,
while if it was money and was lent out by the bailee, under
the above privilege, the bailee was responsible for it absolutely.
We should have placed this obligation in the category of debts
arising from loans; but circumstances caused the Japanese to
work out a similar liability through the machinery of deposit,
-just as the Romans also, in the depositum irregulare, a
similar transaction, worked out the absolute liability of an
ordinary borrower of money.
One might cite a volume full of the interesting coincidences
and divergences which present themselves as one studies the
Japanese civil law. The purely criminal law does not have
the same attraction, for one reason, because it early came
under the influence of Chinese law, and never regained its
independence; for another and connected reason, because it
came almost entirely from above downwards, and was not an
outgrowth of the popular character; and, finally, because its
vitality was almost wholly lost when feudalism fell, and such
attraction as it has is connected more with the study of social
life under the Tokugawas than with that of legal development.
If one were to analyze the reasons for the interest which the
civil branch of the law has for the Western student, he would
probably find three chief elements. First, the polar oppositeness, as compared with the West, of the style in which Japan
has contrived to work out so many traits of language and
manners, leads one to wonder whether in legal relations the
same spirit of contradiction has shown itself. Second, the
idea of justice, as has been said, is in Japan a more flexible
one than we are accustomed in Anglo-Saxon law to aim at;
and there must always be an interest in examining and comparing the results reached under these two extreme types of
strictness and flexibility. Third, the legal system of Japan (on
its civil side) is one of the few which have been permitted by
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their environment to maintain their individuality and reach a
certain stage of development in comparative isolation from
other systems. The Roman was one; -the Germanic was
another, of which the English branch has attained to the first
place. The Hindu, the Slavic, the Mohammedan, and the
Chinese may also be named; and to this list it seems clear
that the Japanese must be added.
John H. Wigmore..
Northwestern University,
Chicago.

